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In Pursuit of Money 
Last October 6, the Federal Reserve made 
what was probably the greatest change in 
monetary pol icy si nce the Federal Reserve-
Treasu ry Accord of 1951, when the Fed broke 
loose from the Treasury dominance which 
had characterized the World War II and early 
postwar years. On October 6, 1979, the Fed 
announced that it was changing the basic 
way in which it conducts open-market poli-
cies-the buying and selling of Government 
securities-in the pursuit of it's monetary ob-
jectives. The Fed described this basic change 
to Congress as follows: 
"Previously the reserve supply had been 
more passively determined by what was 
needed to maintain, in any given short-run 
period, a level of short-term interest rates, in 
particular a level of  the Federal-funds rate, 
that was considered consistent with longer-
term money growth targets. Thus, the new 
procedures entail greater freedom for interest 
rates to change over the short-run in response 
to market forces." 
Many economists had argued that under pre-
vious operating procedures, monetary policy 
tended to amplify movements in real output 
(GNP), instead of moderating and stabilizing 
such cyclical swings as it should. To these 
critics, the policy shift (if successfully pur-
sued) presaged a more stabilizing role for 
monetary policy. But the man in the street-
and many financial analysts-remain dubi-
ous about the outcome of this policy shift. 
The greater stability in money-supply growth 
(if achieved) may seem too great a price for 
the increased variability in interest rates since 
last October. For that reason, it might be use-
ful to examine the intellectual background of 
monetary-control ru les and operating proce-
dures. This means reviewing the previous 
criticism of  the Fed's operating procedures, as 
well as the rules of  thumb that economists 
have proposed for appropriate monetary 
policy. 
Critical legacy 
According to the earlier critics, the Federal 
Reserve, by "targeting" or attempting to 
moderate interest-rate movements, had 
, caused "procyclical" monetary growth. In 
this view, the Fed's attempts to prevent in-
terest rates from rising too fast in a cyclical 
expansion caused the Fed to supply too many 
reserves to the banking system, and thus 
led to overly rapid money growth. Rapid 
money growth then led to unsustainable real 
growth-and in the long run, to greater in-
flation. Conversely, the Fed's atteinpts during 
a cyclical recession to prevent an over-rapid 
decline in interest rates generally led the Fed 
to expand reserves and money less rapidly 
than required to maintain reasonable real-
output growth, and thus tended to worsen 
each economic downturn. In critics' eyes, 
then, the Fed inadvertently tended to amplify 
each business cycle instead of stabilizing it. 
Moreover, its mistaken policies eventually 
led to more rather than less inflation, and 
caused greater and not less peak-to-trough 
movements in interest rates. 
With its previous interest-rate approach to 
control of monetary growth, the Fed at-
tempted to influence the public's demand for 
money. Since money demand is inversely re-
lated to interest rates, this approach dictated 
an increase in interest rates (providing fewer 
reserves) when the Fed wanted to reduce 
money growth -and dictated a reduction in 
rates (maid ng reserves more plentifu I) when 
the Fed wanted to stimulate money growth. 
Under this approach, then, the supply of re-
serves to the banking system was determined 
residually, as the above quotation suggests. In 
other words, the Fed suppl ied whatever level 
of reserves that appeared consistent with its 
short-run interest-rate'targets. 
The Fed in the short run thus determined the 
monthly Fed-funds rate target, usually in 
terms of a range of about 50 to 100 basis 
points (V2  to 1 percentage points), while the public's demand for money determined the 
supply of reserves. To many Fed critics, the 
October 6 policy move did not represent 
simply a choice of operating targets, as be-
tween the funds rate and bank reserves. Rath-
er, it represented a vindication of  their long-
standing view that the economy can be better 
controlled with a monetary aggregate than 
with an interest-rate target. 
Choke of target 
Such critics thus welcomed the new control 
procedures which require Fed control over 
the supply of reserves. Finally, they said, the 
Fed has learned to let the marketplace de-
termine interest rates. But does this by itself 
insure greater stability of the real economy? 
Most economists would probably answer 
yes. The real economy in recent years has 
been hit by a series of unexpected shocks-
shocks affecting supply and demand condi-
tions for goods and services. These shocks 
included the series of  oil price increases of 
1973-74 and 1979-80, as well as the sharp 
reduction in consumer saving in 1978-79. 
These "real shocks" are best absorbed if  the 
Fed concentrates its efforts on controlling the 
nominal quantity of money. If it instead at-
tempts to control interest rates,. the effect on 
the economy of these outside shocks could 
be amplified. 
But this is not  the entire story; the economy is 
also subject to "monetary shocks." In late 
1974, for example, we witnessed a break-
down in the previously stable relationship 
between the aggregate demand for money, 
on the one hand, and income and interest 
rates, on the other. This development came 
about in part because of  the growth of a 
variety of close "money substitutes," such as 
money-market mutual funds and thrift-
institution NOW accounts. But it also re-
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flected the tendency of high interest rates to 
discourage the holding of demand deposits 
and currency, the components of the nar-
rowly defined (M-1) money supply. Nor did 
money growth show much stability this 
spring, when the M1-B money measure de-
clined at a lA-percent annual rate in April but 
then grew at a 14V2-percent rate in June. 
With the economy subjectto both "real" and 
"monetary" shocks, which is the most appro-
priate monetary-policy response-money-
growth targeting or interest-rate targeting? 
Brown University Professor William Poole, 
writing in 1970, argued that if the real shocks 
are greater and less predictable than the 
monetary shocks, the Fed should respond by 
targeting the money supply-and in the re-
verse case, it should respond by targeting 
interest rates. In recent years, real shocks 
seem to have had the greater impact. Thus, in 
moving  explicitly to control monetary growth 
via the supply side (bank reserves) rather  th~lIl 
via the demand side (interest rates), the Fed is 
now in abetter position to respond to shocks 
to the economy coming from the real side. 
I mpact on the markets 
Since the adoption of  the new control ru Ie last 
October, U.S. financial markets have been 
rocked by unprecedented movements in in-
terest rates. This volatility could be attributed 
in part to major shifts in expectations of infla-
tion. But it could also be attributed to the 
Fed's desire to let financial markets determine 
the interest rates that equate the supply and 
demand for money and credit-rather than 
have the Fed determine interest rates and 
have the markets determine the levels of 
money and bank reserves. For example, the 
Fed's decision to let interest rates fall as the 
economy weakened this spring-instead of 
holding them up artificially-tended to cush-
ion the decline in real output without jeo-
pardizing the Fed's long-run anti-inflationary 
policy. 
While greater interest-rate volatility could be 
expected on the basis of the change in Fed 
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cipated the amountof  volatility involved. The 
three-month Treasury-bill rate jumped from 
about 1 °  percent in September 1979 to more 
than 15 percent in March 1980, then plum-
meted to less than 8 percent in May, and 
finally rose to 1 °  percent again by late Au-
gust. Again, these volatile interest-rate move-
ments reflect more than just a change in Fed 
operating procedures. Nonetheless, they 
lend support to the Business Week contention 
that "analysts can no longer be confident that 
they know what the central bank is up to 
simply by watching the key Federal-funds 
rate." 
There's no dou  bt that the change in operati ng 
procedures has created an educational prob-
lem for the Fed. It must first convince the 
public why the change occurred, and explain 
that interest rates no longer have the policy 
significance they once did. But just as impor-
tant, it must convince the public that the new 
operating procedures can bring about greater 
control of the monetary aggregates. 
Control rule 
The Fed is encouraged to "stick to its guns" 
because of the growing perception that the 
public's economic behavior is sensitive to the 
"control rule" of the monetary authorities. In 
contrast, poorly understood changes in poli-
cy threaten to add disruptive uncertainty into 
the real economy. Indeed, substantial policy-
rule changes could reduce our understanding 
of how the real economy operates, specifi-
cally through the mechanism of  the econo-
metric models which attempt to forecast and 
explain the behavior of  our market economy. 
University of Chicago Professor Robert Lu-
cas, Jr., has strongly criticized these econo-
metric models, on the grounds that they fai I  to 
capture the basic changes induced by major 
policy changes in the "structure" -the be-
havioral relationships-of  the U.S. economy. 
The Fed's policy change of last October thus 
may have changed our ability to understand 
how certain sectors of the economy will re-
spond to monetary and fiscal stimuli. 
A more recent case in point was the introduc-
tion and subsequent removal of  the credit-
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restraint program this spring. Economists are 
now puzzling over the effect that that pro-
gram may have had on money demand and 
interest rates during the March-June period. 
This suggests that policy changes-which are 
poorly understood by the public can create as 
many problems as they are intended to solve, 
and blur our understanding of how the pri-
vate economy works. 
On this subject, economists are in a new ball 
game. At this point, we have only a vague 
understanding of how economic behavior 
changes in response to the way economic 
policy is conducted. State-of-the-art econo-
metric models assume that the private sector 
will respond to government stimuli in the 
same way it has in the past. But in a recent 
paper ("After Keynesian Economics"), Pro-
fessor Lucas and Minnesota University Pro-
fessor Thomas Sargent have attacked this 
assumption: "There is no reason, in ouropin-
ion, to bel ieve that these (econometric) mod-
els have isolated structures which will remain 
invariant across the class of interventions that 
figure ·in contemporary discussions of eco-
nomic policy." 
The Federal Reserve policy change of last 
October 6 could be interpreted as having 
altered our understanding of how the private 
market economy interacts. For this reason, 
the Fed is under pressure to stick to its present 
operati  ng procedu res -targeti  ng money su p-
ply rather than interest rates-so as to maxi-
mizetheir credibility with the private market. 
According to this view, the need for "credi-
bi I  ity" on the part ofthe monetary authorities 
is not simply rhetoric, but is a means of in-
suring the structural stability of  the private 
economy. 
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Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed  ( -) 
*  Excl\.ldes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
8/20/80  8/13/80 
41  57 
36  31 
5  88 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
6,719  5.1 
7,983  7.4 
1,990  6.3 
7,307  18.3 
652  2.8 
1,038  53.9 
1,278  - 16.9 
14  0.1 
1,280  3.0 
896  2.9 
1,272  - 4.1 
10,190  19.4 
10,370  23.6 
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